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1. Introduction
The topic of opportunism is one that has been studied in various
buyer–supplier contexts (e.g., Carson et al., 2006; Jap and
Anderson, 2003). Opportunism can occur when either firm in a
buyer–supplier dyad unilaterally behaves for its own gain (Conner
and Prahalad, 1996) and strains negotiations between firms. In the
supply chain context, opportunism can encompass a wide range of
behaviors (Carson et al., 2006; Wathne and Heide, 2000). Some of
these may be passive, as in the case of quality shirking and
misrepresentation or exaggeration of capability, or active, as in the
case of contract breaching and violation of promotion agreements
(Arino, 2001). Opportunism can even result in production
disruptions, causing supply chain inefficiencies and significant
negative economic impacts (Morgan et al., 2007). In addition, the
formation of supply chain alliances between firms may fail due to
the fear of opportunistic behaviors by potential partners (McCarter
and Northcraft, 2007). These adverse consequences of opportun-
ism on firm and supply chain performance stress the importance of
controlling opportunism occurrences in exchange relationships
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2005; Morgan et al., 2007). Managers thus
dedicate considerable resources and efforts to monitoring and
controlling exchange partners in highly opportunistic risk situa-
tions (Wathne and Heide, 2000).
To effectively structure the various types of firm governance
modes that function to prevent opportunism within an exchange
relationship poses an important and difficult challenge. The extant
research has attempted to identify self-enforcing safeguards such
as the use of market, hierarchy, and relational governance
approaches and has studied their strengths in mitigating
opportunism (e.g., Carson et al., 2006; Wuyts and Geyskens,
2005). Nevertheless, recent research on the mitigation of buyer–
supplier opportunism has focused on organization-level gover-
nance mechanisms, particularly relational governance through the
use of relational norms. These relational mechanisms are typically
referred to as the values shared among exchange partners
concerning appropriate behavior that maintains or improves their
relationship (e.g., Heide and John, 1992; Macneil, 1980; Noor-
dewier et al., 1990). However, this stream of research has largely
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ignored the role of human agents in mitigating opportunism in
buyer–supplier relationships. Without considering the role of
human agents in the opportunism-mitigating mechanism, we run
the risk of attributing potential effects that are indeed exerted from
individuals’ characteristics and behaviors to that of firms, thus
leading to a cross-level fallacy that threatens the validity of the
research findings (Rousseau, 1985; Zaheer et al., 1998; Burton-
Jones and Gallivan, 2007).
The importance of human agents in various aspects of exchange
relationships has been highlighted by a broad range ofmanagement
and business literature such as supply chainmanagement (e.g., Batt,
2003; Faes et al., 2001; Marshall et al., 2007), organizational studies
(e.g.,Williamson, 1979; Zaheer et al., 1998), andmarketing (e.g., Jap,
2001), aswell as practitioner-oriented literature (e.g., Anderson and
Jap, 2005). These literature streams reinforce the need to study
factors at the individual (i.e., agent) level when examining
interorganizational dynamics and motivate us to recenter the
analytical lens on individual agents when investigating opportun-
ism in buyer–supplier relationships. By extending the current
research in buyer–supplier opportunism beyond emphasizing
relational norms as a key opportunism-mitigating factor, this study
addresses two research questions: (1) ‘What are the main effects of
agent characteristics onmitigating opportunism?’ and (2) ‘Whatare the
interaction effects of agent characteristics and relational norms on
mitigating opportunism?’ Through an investigation of the personal
characteristics of human agents in tandem with relational norms,
this study potentially provides a more generalizable multi-level
theory of opportunism mitigation in buyer–supplier relationships
and sheds insights into the effectiveness of opportunism-mitigation
practices in supply chains.
Since managers and sales/purchasing professionals in buyer
and supplier firms often act as decision-making agents in
exchange-related decisions, they may tend to engage in dynamic
processes embedded in their exchange relationship, such as
information sharing, joint problem solving, and conflict resolution
that can be categorized as varying degrees of cooperative
behaviors. These cooperative behaviors facilitate communication,
enhance mutual gains between exchange partners, mediate inter-
firm conflicts, and promote a long-term orientation in the
exchange relationship, thus potentially mitigating opportunism
(e.g., Dabholkar et al., 1994; Weitz and Bradford, 1999). As such,
our investigative efforts are specifically focused on the effect of
decision-making agents’ cooperativeness (which refers to the
personality trait that reflects an individual’s predisposition to act
in tolerant, empathetic, supportive, and compassionate manners
towards others; refer to e.g., Cloninger et al., 1994) and on the
interaction effect of agent cooperativeness and relational norms on
opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. As a pioneering step
to unveil the agent-level effect on opportunism in buyer–supplier
relationships, we focus our investigation on a single-agent
exchange scenario, leaving a more complex multi-agent scenario
for future research endeavors.
In the next section, we provide the background of this study,
which briefly summarizes key approaches to mitigating oppor-
tunism in the buyer–supplier relationship literature. Following
this, we discuss the development of the hypotheses in Section 3
and the experiments and their results in Sections 4 and 5. We then
end the paper with discussion and conclusion in Section 6.
2. Background of the study
The broad literature on transaction cost economics and buyer–
supplier relationships suggests three common approaches to
controlling opportunism (e.g., Heide, 1994; McCarter and North-
craft, 2007; Morgan et al., 2007; Williamson, 1981). One approach
is to incorporate the use of formal business contracts. This
contractual or market approach is commonly used in marketing
channels as a means to coordinate actions between exchange
partners (e.g., Dixit, 2003). To effectively mitigate opportunism,
contracts may be designed to consider different environmental
scenarios and spell out specific terms in great precision (Luo,
2006). However, bounded rationality prevents individuals from
creating omniscient contracts; as a result, they provide limited
protection in that they can only protect against those actions and
contingencies that were anticipated at the outset (Williamson,
1985). Unexpected contingencies are always a possibility, and
contracts tend to be insufficiently flexible to adequately cope with
frequent environmental changes.
A second approach to mitigating opportunism risks is to utilize
the hierarchy approach (Williamson, 1981, 1985). A hierarchical
form of governance relies more heavily on internal enforcement
mechanisms based on legitimate authority derived from employ-
ment relations (Heide, 1994). Williamson (1981) suggests that
transactions characterizedbyhigh asset specificity andhighdegrees
of uncertainty are more effectively governed by hierarchy than by
market. Vertically integrating suppliers and their capabilities
eliminates the risk of opportunistic behavior by a supplier and
yields coordination benefits for the integrating firm (Lu and He´bert,
2005). However, in many cases, this approach may be impractical
and insufficient due to the extent of capital investment required or a
lack of needed capabilities in the supply base.
Yet another governance approach suggested by the theory is the
use of relational mechanisms such as relational contracting to
mitigate opportunism risks (Carr and Pearson, 1999). This
relational governance approach rests on the premise that
transactions are typically embedded in social relationships, and
thus there exist non-legal sanctions in the form of relational norms
that motivate buyers and suppliers to commit in their exchange
relationships (Heide and John, 1992;Macneil, 1980). The relational
governance approach has gained much popularity in the buyer–
supplier relationship literature over the last two decades (e.g.,
Chen et al., 2004; Dyer and Singh, 1998; McCarter and Northcraft,
2007), and it arguably does not fall prey to the same shortcomings
found in the market or hierarchy approaches. Thus, many firms
have begun to rely on this approach by developing long-term
relationships and establishing relational norms in their exchange
relationships that help govern the behaviors of the exchange
partners. Toyota is a case-in-point illustrating the use of this
relational approach. Various Toyota practices, such as emphasizing
corporate values rather than skill development in dealership
seminars, are attempts towards developing relational norms and
social controls (Mehri, 2006; Wathne and Heide, 2000).
Recent studies on the relational governance approach have
investigated the effectiveness of inter-firm relational structures in
mitigating opportunism and further examined the nature of
opportunism in inter-firm relationships. Relational governance
developed through processes such as socialization is regarded as
an effective mechanism to mitigate both passive and active
opportunistic behaviors in the exchanges (Wathne and Heide,
2000). Relational governance reflects shared values and social
norms among individual members, which in turn harmonize their
interests and govern their behaviors (Chalos and O’Connor, 2004;
Ouchi, 1980), and it effectively mitigates opportunism in volatile
situations, though not in situations with high ambiguity (Carson
et al., 2006). Some researchers have highlighted the complemen-
tary role of formal contracts in relational governance, as well-
specified contracts help to clarify exchange partners’ roles and
expectations and provide clarity in exchange terms, remedies, and
conflict resolution procedures (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The
process-oriented features of contracts such as the process of
articulating complex contracts can also build commitment
between exchange partners and facilitate the functions of
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relational norms in promoting long-term relationships and
limiting opportunism. In turn, relational governance can overcome
the adaptive limits of formal contracts by endorsing bilateral and
long-term orientations and promoting the continuity of relation-
ships in the event of external change or conflict; thus, the exchange
partners can attain a mutually acceptable resolution and sustain
their exchange relationships (Macneil, 1980; Poppo and Zenger,
2002). In addition, institutional factors such as contract law can
play an important role in paving foundations for long-term and
cooperative relationships and in promoting trust among firms
(Arrighetti et al., 1997). Within different institutional contexts, the
effects of contractual and relational governance mechanisms may
differ. While Poppo and Zenger (2002) purported the complemen-
tary roles of formal contracts and relational governance, Liu et al.
(2009) found evidence that partially supports such a complemen-
tary effect in an emerging economy. Specifically, the joint effect
between contract and relational norms on opportunism was not
significant, whereas between contract and trust it was significant.
That being said, the predominant research stream in the
relational governance approach has focused on relational norms as
a key governing force in mitigating opportunism and examined
opportunism through an organization-level analytical lens
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). This line of research seems to implicitly
assume that human agents operating in buyer–supplier relation-
ships are subdued to the exchange norms, and therefore the role of
human agents in dynamic exchange relationships is largely
overlooked and understudied. Yet literature in operations and
supply chain management has highlighted the significance of
human agents in organizational performance. In product develop-
ment, direct personal contacts across functional units and liaison
roles at these units were found to have positive influences on the
speed of product development (Clark and Fujimoto, 1992). With
regards to sourcing decisions, political motivations and personal
motives of managers were found to play major roles in influencing
decision-making (Marshall et al., 2007), while the traits of
purchasing professionals were associated with the effectiveness
of the purchasing function (Faes et al., 2001).
Evidence of the important role of human agents in dynamic
exchange relationships also abounds in the broader management
and business literatures. For instance, agent personal character-
istics and behaviors are known to hinder or foster the formation of
exchange relationships among firms. As Kanter (1989) and Lyons
et al. (1990) documented, past corporate initiatives by some U.S.
automakers in the late 1980s to move towards a partnering
relationship with their component suppliers in response to
changing market conditions was undermined by individual
purchasing agents who continued to treat the suppliers opportu-
nistically. Anderson and Jap (2005) also revealed that opportunis-
tic behaviors exhibited by decision-making agents can still occur
even in a long-established relational exchange. On the other hand,
personal relationships developed between individuals acting on
behalf of their organizations in relational exchanges can serve to
generate trust and discourage opportunistic behaviors between
the firms (Zaheer et al., 1998). Similarly, the marketing literature
has indicated that cooperative sales agents can play a significant
role in relationship continuance in established exchange relation-
ships (Biong and Selnes, 1996; Dabholkar et al., 1994; Weitz and
Bradford, 1999) and that the demonstration of benevolence, i.e.,
the showing of compassion and cooperative action, by agents can
provide assurance of non-opportunism to exchange parties (Jap,
2001). As evident in the cases of IBM and Xerox, when sales agents
take an active role and engage themselves in the problem-solving
efforts and various value-added activities of the client firms, both
vendor firms and their clients can achieve mutual benefits (Biong
and Selnes, 1996; Fierman, 1994). Another illustrative case is that,
despite overwhelming disadvantages in costs and product lines,
Caterpillar in the 1980s was successful in preventing Komatsu
from becoming the dominant force in the U.S. construction
machinery and equipment industry, and this success was
attributed to the strong personal ties between Caterpillar’s
personnel and its dealers (Fites, 1996). This stream of literature
underlines the importance of having cooperative agents in charge
of managing exchange relationships. This is also consistent with
the conflict resolution and negotiation literature (e.g., Butler, 1999;
Rahim, 1983; Volkema and Bergmann, 1995) which has identified
cooperativeness as a key personal characteristic of agents that
promotes concern for others and reduces the likelihood of
opportunism in negotiation encounters and conflict resolutions.
Guided by the above literature, we focused our investigative
efforts on cooperativeness as a personal characteristic of decision-
making agents (i.e., an individual-level factor) and how it may act
independently or in concert with relational norms (i.e., an
organization-level factor) in mitigating opportunism in buyer–
supplier relationships. Examining these factors across multiple
levels could potentially result in amore thorough understanding of
opportunism mitigation in exchange relationships, as Klassen and
Menor (2007) and Rousseau (1985) have suggested. We systemat-
ically examined this issue from three different but related
perspectives in explaining opportunism in exchange relationships,
namely, the organizationalist perspective (based on relational
norms), the individualist perspective (based on agent cooperative-
ness), and the interactionist perspective (based on the interaction
between relational norms and agent cooperativeness). The
conceptual framework encapsulating these three perspectives
and their corresponding hypotheses is illustrated in Fig. 1.
3. Hypothesis development
3.1. Organizationalist perspective
The organizationalist perspective is based on the thrust that
relational norms act as a governance mechanism in controlling
opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. Relational gover-
nance is one of three opportunism-mitigating mechanisms (i.e.,
relational, contractual, and hierarchical) suggested by the trans-
action cost economics and buyer–supplier relationship literature
(e.g., Heide, 1994; McCarter and Northcraft, 2007; Morgan et al.,
2007; Williamson, 1981) and has been the focus of much study in
the buyer–supplier relationship literature over the past two
decades (e.g., Chen et al., 2004; Dyer and Singh, 1998; McCarter
and Northcraft, 2007). However, the extant literature has shown
mixed results on the effectiveness of this organization-level factor
in mitigating opportunism (Brown et al., 2000; Carson et al., 2006).
For example, while Brown et al. (2000) confirmed that relational
norms can effectively mitigate opportunism in exchange relation-
ships, Carson et al. (2006) found that the effectiveness of relational
norms as a governance mechanism in curbing opportunism was
contingent on the conditions of volatility and ambiguity.
Relational norms can be described as the values and priorities
shared among exchange partners concerning what is considered
appropriate behavior in the relationship, and these norms are
based on expectations of mutual interests and behaviors that
enhance the continuation of the relationship (Heide and John,
1992; Macneil, 1980; Noordewier et al., 1990). When low
relational norms are present in a buyer–supplier relationship,
the firms tend to display distributive or aggressive bargaining
behaviors (Ganesan, 1993). Formal legal contracts are utilized to
govern these relationships and aggressive negotiation is used to
reduce ambiguity and resolve disagreements, which may lead to
opportunistic behaviors (Carson et al., 2006). Relationships
characterized by high relational norms are portrayed by firms
that exhibit greater commitment to the partnership, display a
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long-term orientation, and strive for mutual interests. All these
provide a foundation for constraining opportunism in exchange
relationships (Carson et al., 2006; Ganesan, 1994). In short, low
relational norm relationships tend to be competitive and
adversarial, while high relational norm relationships tend to be
cooperative and partnerial. Due to these traits, opportunistic
behaviors tend to beminimal in high relational norm relationships.
This line of reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Relational norms are negatively related to oppor-
tunism in exchange relationships.
3.2. Individualist perspective
The individualist perspective conjectures that human agents
play a major role in explaining idiosyncratic behaviors in buyer–
supplier relationships. This perspective is guided by the personali-
ty trait theory, postulating that personality traits – which are
relatively stable sets of psychological characteristics and behav-
ioral attributes and differ from one individual to another – explain
the behaviors of individuals (e.g., Allport, 1937; Cattel, 1965;Weiss
and Adler, 1984). This line of reasoning has also guided other
management theories. For example, Theories X and Y (McGregor,
1960) espouse the different motivational natures of individuals,
leading to the different approaches to managing people in
organizations. Similarly, the logic of personality trait theory is
also fundamental to the early leadership research that primarily
focused on the key attributes of leaders (e.g., Bass, 1990) and is
embedded in a more recent stream of leadership research that
focuses on emotional intelligence as a key attribute of leaders (e.g.,
Dasborough, 2006; Hawkins and Dulewicz, 2007). At the funda-
mental level, personality trait theory highlights the important role
of different personalities or characteristics that explain behavioral
differences among individuals.
Guided by the logic embodied in the personality trait theory, we
proposed the individualist perspective of opportunism in buyer–
supplier relationships on the premise that different degrees of
opportunism in buyer–supplier exchanges can be explained by
characteristics of human agents who function in such exchange
relationships. These agents, driven by their inherent character-
istics, can act opportunistically or benevolently towards their
exchange partners. While there are numerous human character-
istics and traits identified in the literature, in this study we only
focus on ‘cooperativeness’, which is suggested by the conflict
resolution and negotiation literature as a key characteristic of
human agents in negotiation and decision-making contexts (e.g.,
Butler, 1999; Rahim, 1983; Volkema and Bergmann, 1995;Wilmot
and Hocker, 2001). Cooperativeness is also established as a distinct
human characteristic in the personality and individual differences
literature (e.g., Cloninger et al., 1994; Duijsens et al., 2000).
Cooperativeness is multifaceted, consisting of elements of
agreeableness (i.e., acceptance/empathy), general teamorientation
(hereafter teamwork), and compassion (e.g., Chatman and Barsade,
1995; Cloninger et al., 1994; Yilmaz and Hunt, 2001). Highly
cooperative individuals possess high concern for others (Wilmot
and Hocker, 2001) and are described as tolerant, empathetic,
supportive, compassionate, fair, and principle-centered (e.g.,
Cloninger et al., 1994). They are service-oriented and attempt to
cooperate with others as much as possible; hence, cooperative
individuals tend to bemotivatedmore by a concern for others than
by their own self-interest (Chatman and Barsade, 1995; Wilmot
and Hocker, 2001). In buyer–supplier exchange contexts, the
cooperativeness of decision-making agents canmotivate behaviors
that (a) facilitate communication and information sharing, (b)
support joint problem solving andmutual gains between exchange
partners, and (c) mediate the conflicts and promote long-term
orientation in the exchanges, all of which are benevolent to the
relationships and collectively limit opportunism by exchange
partners (Biong and Selnes, 1996; Dabholkar et al., 1994; Jap, 2001;
Weitz and Bradford, 1999). We therefore contend that the
cooperativeness of decision-making agents in charge of exchange
relationships tend to curb the display of opportunistic behaviors.
This line of reasoning yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. Agent cooperativeness is negatively related to
opportunism in exchange relationships.
Agent cooperativeness can be considered an internal oppor-
tunism-inhibiting force embodied in the decision-making agents,
whereas relational norms are considered a force external to the
agents that is established by firms to limit opportunism from
taking place in their exchange relationships. While agent
cooperativeness and relational norms are two separate opportun-
ism-controlling mechanisms, they can coexist in exchange
relationships. Relational norms can create an exchange environ-
ment in which opportunism is less likely to occur (e.g., Heide and
John, 1992; Wathne and Heide, 2000), and concurrently coopera-
tive agents managing the exchange relationships can exhibit
benevolent behaviors, which can further reduce the likelihood of
opportunism (Jap, 2001). However, even in long-established
relational exchanges, opportunistic behaviors (typically exhibited
by the less cooperative agents) can still occur and ultimately
jeopardize the relationships (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Therefore,
even when relational norms are established, there is still room for
agent cooperativeness to further reduce opportunism in exchange
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework.
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relationships. This line of argument suggests an extended
hypothesis, as follows:
Hypothesis 2b. Agent cooperativeness is negatively related to
opportunism in exchange relationships, and explains the unique
variance of opportunism over and above relational norms.
3.3. Interactionist perspective
Finally, the interactionist perspective of opportunism in buyer–
supplier relationships focuses on the interaction effect of relational
norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism. This perspec-
tive rests upon the logic embedded in the contingency theory
literature (e.g., Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967) which in a general sense suggests that the interaction of
internal and external factors tends to determine organizational
outcomes. This interactionist perspective has provided theoretical
guidance to various organizational research studies (e.g., Chatman
and Barsade, 1995; Tett and Burnett, 2003; Tett and Guterman,
2000). For example, in a job performance study, Tett and Burnett
(2003) proposed a personality-based interactionist model, sug-
gesting that personality traits exert their influence on job
performance in response to certain trait-relevant situational cues
(Tett and Guterman, 2000). Similarly, Chatman and Barsade (1995)
investigated the influence of personality and organizational
culture on workplace cooperation and found that the level of
cooperative behavior in the workplace was a function of the
interaction between personal characteristics (i.e., cooperative
versus individualistic agents) and organizational culture (i.e.,
collectivistic versus individualistic cultures). Overall, this streamof
literature suggests that the phenomena of interest may be better
understood through the interactionist lens than the organization-
alist and individualist lenses.
In the context of buyer–supplier relationships, the literature
from the organizationalist perspective provides an understanding
of the mechanism by which organization-level factors such as
relational norms can curb opportunism in exchange relationships
(e.g., Brown et al., 2000; Carson et al., 2006; Wathne and Heide,
2000). Independent of the organizationalist perspective, the
individualist perspective recenters the analytical lens on human
agents in exchange relationships by focusing on how agent
personal characteristics such as cooperativeness can influence
opportunistic behaviors in exchange relationships. However, to
more thoroughly understand opportunism mitigation in exchange
relationships, both organization-level and agent-level factors need
to be examined simultaneously (Rousseau, 1985).
Organizational factors constitute an operating environment in
which individual agents in an organization function and can serve
to promote or hinder certain agent behaviors. Concurrently,
individual agents may possess unique sets of characteristics or
personalities and may, by nature, be predisposed to behave in
certain directions. Thus, the behavioral responses of individual
agents, although driven by their personal characteristics and
predispositions, must be associatedwith the context in which they
operate (Mischel, 2004). When the operating environment is
comprised of organizational factors that are trait-relevant, the
personal characteristics of the agents who operate under such a
condition can be activated and express their behavioral influence
(Tett and Burnett, 2003; Tett and Guterman, 2000). As such, the
interaction between organizational and individual factors may
hold keys in explaining various organizational phenomena. Along
the same lines of the trait activation argument (Tett and Guterman,
2000), we contend that relational norms constitute an operating
environment in which individual agents function and buyer–
supplier exchanges take place. Relational norms espouse long-
term relationships, collaborative efforts, and mutual gains
between exchange partners (e.g., Heide and John, 1992; Macneil,
1980; Noordewier et al., 1990) while cooperativeness as a key
agent characteristic predisposes agents to be concerned for others
and to act in supportive, compassionate, and fair manners (e.g.,
Cloninger et al., 1994;Wilmot andHocker, 2001). Relational norms
arguably become an operating condition in which agent coopera-
tiveness can be activated and can fully exert its influence in
suppressing opportunism in the exchange relationship. Simply put,
agent cooperativeness acting in concert with established relational
norms can create a more powerful force in restraining opportun-
ism in buyer–supplier relationships than if agent cooperativeness
and relational norms act independently. The interaction of
relational norms and agent cooperativenessmay therefore become
key tomitigating opportunistic behaviors in the relationships. This
line of logic suggests the final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The interaction of relational norms and agent co-
operativeness is negatively related to opportunism in exchange
relationships, and explains the unique variance of opportunism
over and above relational norms and agent cooperativeness.
To test the proposed hypotheses, we used the scenario-based
experiment research methodology. The previous research has
suggested that experiments are an appropriate researchmethod to
study the behavioral aspects of operations and supply chains
(Bendoly and Swink, 2007;Mantel et al., 2006). Amajor strength of
experimental research lies in its replicability, allowing researchers
to replicate the study with another subject group to further
validate the experimental results. We therefore conducted two
separate experimental studies. In Study 1, we used MBA students
as experimental subjects, representing relatively young business
professionals who are less established in their management career.
Besides practical advantages such as convenient access to data and
minimal data collection cost, using MBA student subjects in place
of experienced managers permits researchers to create a more
controlled environment and to ensure that the effect of their prior
experience is randomized and will not largely explain the research
findings (Carter and Stevens, 2007), thus enhancing the internal
validity of the findings. However, a key concern with this practice
is the external validity limitation (Gordon et al., 1986). Hence, in
Study 2, we replicated Study 1 with experienced practicing
managers to validate the findings of Study 1. Studies 1 and 2 are
described in the next two sections.
4. Study 1
4.1. Subjects and experimental design
The subjects were 103 business professionals inMBA courses at
three different campuses. The sample characteristics were as
follows: (a) 57.3% male and 42.7% female; (b) 74.8% Caucasian and
25.2% non-Caucasian; (c) 53.4% of subjects from an urban campus,
20.4% from a suburban campus and 26.2% from a rural campus; (d)
an average age of 28.6 years; (e) an average professional
experience and average management experience of 6.5 and 1.8
years, respectively.
We used validated buyer–supplier relationship scenarios from
Joshi and Arnold’s (1998) study and randomly assigned subjects
into two groups of low and high relational norms. The subjects in
each group read a short business scenario adapted from Joshi and
Arnold’s (1998) buyer–supplier relationship scenarios. In the
scenario, subjects assumed the role of a purchasing manager at a
midsize electronic equipment manufacturer responsible for
purchasing microchips from a supplier partner. The subjects were
provided with information that the microchip supply could
potentially be disrupted by labor disputes, a problem that could
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disrupt the delivery of product to their customers. After reading
the scenario, subjects were asked to rate the nature of their
reaction in terms of their opportunism towards the supplier. To
increase the room for opportunism, subjects were also informed
that they could easily replace the existing supplier without
significant costs or disruptions in their operations. Subjects in both
groups were given identical introductory and concluding sections
of the scenario, but received different manipulation materials
pertaining to low and high relational norms based on the group to
which they were assigned (see Appendix A for the full description
of scenarios used in the experiment). We successfully performed
the manipulation check, as a t-test indicated that the average
rating on the manipulation check item, ‘‘I personally feel that my
company has an informal, close, cooperative relationship with the
supplier.’’ of subjects in the high relational norms group
(mean = 5.73) was statistically different from that of the low
relational norms group (mean = 2.78) at the p < 0.001 level.
4.2. Measurements and statistical models
We used Joshi and Arnold’s (1998) validated three-item
instrument along with three additional items modified from those
of Jap and Anderson (2003) and Provan and Skinner (1989) to
measure opportunism (see Appendix B). Subjects responded to each
questionnaire itemusing the1–7scale (i.e., 1 = StronglyDisagreeand
7 = StronglyAgree). Principal component analysis (PCA) showed that
four items of opportunism (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) were highly
correlated and loaded onto one factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of
0.73, and their factor scorewas thereforeusedas a single-component
measure of opportunism in this study. The other items did not load
significantly onto the factor and were excluded from the analysis.
Relational norms were the manipulations in the experiment
(see Appendix A for details) and the high and low relational norms
groups were coded as 1 and 0, respectively. Regarding agent
cooperativeness, we used an 18-item survey instrumentwith a 1–7
rating system to measure agent cooperativeness. This instrument
was developed based on the notion that cooperativeness is a
multifaceted construct that consists of agreeableness, teamwork,
and compassion (e.g., Chatman and Barsade, 1995; Cloninger et al.,
1994; Yilmaz and Hunt, 2001). Initially, our instrument had 25
items, drawn from existing questionnaire items in the literature
(Goldberg, 2006; O’Shea et al., 2004; Yilmaz and Hunt, 2001). After
we pre-tested the instrument with 48 undergraduate business
students, seven items were dropped due to their low inter-
correlation with others, and several items were reworded to
improve their clarity. The final 18-item instrument (6 items per
sub-scale) used in this study is shown in Appendix B.
We performed correlation analysis and PCA to assess the
unidimensionality of the items in each sub-scale. We found that
the four items for Agreeableness (A1, A2, A3, and A4) were highly
loaded onto a single factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81, while
the three items for Teamwork (B1, B4, and B5) were highly loaded
onto one component with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66, and the three
items for Compassion (C2, C3, and C4) were highly loaded onto a
single component with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81. The factor score
fromeach PCAwas used as a single-componentmeasure for each of
the three cooperativeness sub-scales in this study. In addition, the
second-order exploratory factor analysis indicated that Agreeable-
ness, Teamwork, and Compassionwere highly correlated and loaded
onto one higher-order factor. Then, a confirmatory factor analysis
was performed to assess their goodness-of-fit, and the results
indicated that Agreeableness, Teamwork, and Compassion fit well
together as one construct, with a goodness-of-fit index of 1.00
(p = 0.91). Therefore, the average of these three first-order factor
scores was used as a composite measure of agent cooperativeness
for the subsequent analyses in this study. The results of these factor
analyses are summarized in Table 1.
We also controlled for other variables that were not part of our
research questions, including (a) years of management experience
– kept as a continuous variable, (b) age – also kept as a continuous
variable, (c) campus – ordinally coded as 1, 2 and 3 for rural,
suburban, and urban campuses, respectively, (d) gender –male and
female coded as 1 and 0, respectively, and (e) ethnicity – Caucasian
and non-Caucasian coded as 1 and 0, respectively. We then used
three regression models to test our proposed hypotheses in
examining the effects of relational norms, agent cooperativeness,
and the interaction of relational norms and agent cooperativeness
on opportunism in the buyer–supplier relationship, controlling for
the other control variables mentioned above. The regression
models are as follows:
 Organizationalist model: Opportunism = constant + b1 Gender + -
b2 Ethnicity + b3 Age + b4Management Experience + b5 Campus
+ b6 Relational Norms + errors.
Table 1
Summary results of factor analyses.
Scale Item Factor loading Factor 1 Factor 2 Bartlett’s test
Eigenvalue % Variance Eigenvalue % Variance
Opportunism Q1 0.85 2.23 55.65% 0.89 22.34% 105.32***
Q2 0.78
Q3 0.67
Q4 (reverse) 0.67
Agreeableness A1 0.86 2.57 64.19% 0.63 15.69% 140.52***
A2 0.79
A3 0.71
A4 0.84
Teamwork B1 0.81 1.79 59.77% 0.67 22.39% 43.98***
B4 0.73
B5 0.78
Compassion C2 (reverse) 0.84 2.19 72.84% 0.50 16.60% 106.66***
C3 (reverse) 0.82
C4 (reverse) 0.89
Cooperativenessa Agreeableness 0.78 1.66 55.21% 0.76 25.24% 30.75***
Teamwork 0.77
Compassion 0.67
a Goodness-of-fit index was 1.00; chi square was insignificant with p=0.91.
*** p<0.001.
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 Individualist model A (independent): Opportunism = constant
+ b1 Gender + b2 Ethnicity + b3 Age + b4Management Experien-
ce + b5 Campus + b6 Agent Cooperativeness + errors.
 Individualist model B (causal order): Opportunism = constant
+ b1 Gender + b2 Ethnicity + b3 Age + b4Management Experience
+ b5 Campus + b6 Relational Norms + b7 Agent Cooperativeness
+ errors.
 Interactionist model: Opportunism = constant + b1 Gender + b2
Ethnicity + b3 Age + b4Management Experience + b5 Campus + b6
Relational Norms + b7 Agent Cooperativeness + b8(Relational
Norms  Agent Cooperativeness) + errors.
To provide further insight into the underlying relationships of
Opportunism, Relational Norms, and Agent Cooperativeness, we
also examined the variation of opportunism across these models
using ANOVA. We converted Agent Cooperativeness into a low-
versus-high scale via the median split method (Kaufman et al.,
2000). Using the low-versus-high scales of Relational Norms and
Agent Cooperativeness, we divided subjects into four groups of a
two-by-two design as shown in Fig. 2 and performed the tests
between-subjects effects as well as the group mean comparisons
regarding opportunism. While regression analysis is useful in
examining the relationships among the variables of interest,
ANOVA examines the mean differences among groups that are
formed based on certain variables, traits, or characteristics of
interest. As such, ANOVA can provide a vivid depiction of the
statistical results and can complement the results presented in the
relational form of regression analysis, thus increasing their clarity.
In addition, the descriptivemean of the raw cooperativeness scores
in each group is provided in Fig. 2; hence, the results based on
factor scores can be interpreted in a more absolute sense.
4.3. Data analysis and results
We began the data analysis by performing correlation analyses,
which indicated that there were some significant correlations
among our control variables. Management Experience was posi-
tively associated with Age (coefficient = 0.54, p< 0.001), indicating
that the older the subjects were, the more management experience
they had. Also, Campus was negatively related to Gender
(coefficient =0.21, p < 0.05) and Ethnicity (coefficient = 0.24,
p < 0.05), suggesting that the proportion of female and non-
Caucasian subjects at the urban and suburban campuses was
greater than at the rural campus. Nevertheless, Variance Inflation
Factors did not indicate multicollinearity problems among them;
therefore, the underlying assumptions of multiple regression
analysis were not violated. In addition, using the standardized
residual approach, we identified one outlier and thus excluded it
from further data analyses.
The results of the multiple regression analyses are summarized
in Table 2. With Opportunism as the dependent variable, four
regression models – Organizationalist, Individualist A (indepen-
dent), Individualist B (causal order), and Interactionist – in addition
to the control model in Table 2 were used to test the effects of
Table 2
Multiple regression analysis results in Study 1.
Dependent variable: opportunism Beta
Control model Organizationalist model Individualist model A Individualist model B Interactionist model
Control variables
Gender 0.07 (0.20) 0.05 (0.20) 0.20 (0.20) 0.17 (0.20) 0.22 (0.20)
Ethnicity 0.16 (0.24) 0.16 (0.23) 0.21 (0.23) 0.20 (0.22) 0.07 (0.23)
Age 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Management experience 0.08y (0.04) 0.07 (0.04) 0.08y (0.04) 0.07y (0.04) 0.07y (0.04)
Campus 0.04 (0.12) 0.03 (0.12) 0.09 (0.12) 0.08 (0.12) 0.12 (0.12)
Independent variables
Relational Norms 0.34y (0.20) 0.30 (0.19) 0.30 (0.19)
Agent Cooperativeness 0.44** (0.13) 0.42** (0.13) 0.16 (0.18)
Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness 0.54* (0.27)
R2 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.20
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.13
F value 0.74 1.13 2.45* 2.51* 2.79**
Incremental R2 0.03a 0.10a 0.09b 0.04c
Incremental F value 3.03y 10.66** 8.86** 4.14*
a Incremental R2 from comparing with the control model.
b Incremental R2 from comparing with the organizationalist model.
c Incremental R2 from comparing with the individualist model B.
y p<0.1.
* p<0.05.
** p<0.01.
Fig. 2. Two-by-two design for ANOVA.
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Relational Norms, Agent Cooperativeness, and their interaction on
Opportunism (Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, and 3). The results of the
Organizationalist model indicate that after controlling for the
control variables, Relational Norms was negatively related to
Opportunism (p < 0.1) although the overall model was not
significant. The incremental R2 of the Organizationalist model
over the control model was significant (p < 0.1), with Relational
Norms improving on the total explained variation in Opportunism
from 4% R2 in the control model to 7% R2 in the Organizationalist
model. However, these results provided limited support for
Hypothesis 1. The results in Table 2 also indicate that the
Individualist model A was overall significant (p < 0.05), and that
after controlling for the control variables, Agent Cooperativeness
was negatively related to Opportunism (p < 0.01). The incremental
R2 of the Individualistmodel over the controlmodelwas significant
(p < 0.05), with Agent Cooperativeness increasing the total
explained variation in Opportunism from 4% R2 in the control
model to 14% R2 in the Individualist model A. These results thus
yield support for Hypothesis 2a.
While Hypotheses 1 and 2a focus simply on the main effects of
Relational Norms and Agent Cooperativeness as two separate
explanatory variables of Opportunism, respectively, Hypothesis 2b
focuses primarily on the effect of Agent Cooperativeness on
Opportunism over and above that of Relational Norms, and was
tested by the Individualist model B in Table 2. The results of the
Individualist model B, which contains both Relational Norms and
Agent Cooperativeness as independent variables in the model,
indicate that after controlling for the control variables, Agent
Cooperativeness was negatively related to Opportunism (p < 0.01)
whereas Relational Norms was not, and the overall model was
significant at p < 0.05. This suggests that adding Agent Coopera-
tiveness (an individual-level characteristic) into the Organization-
alist model, which relies only on Relational Norms as the
independent variable, does weaken the explanatory power of
Relational Norms (an organization-level characteristic). In addi-
tion, the incremental R2 of the Individualist model B over the
Organizationalist model was 9% (up from 7% in the Organization-
alist model to 16% in the Individualist model B) andwas significant
at p < 0.01. These results thus support Hypothesis 2b.
Finally, Hypothesis 3, which focuses on the interaction effect of
Relational Norms and Agent Cooperativeness on Opportunism, was
tested by the Interactionist model. The results are shown in Table 2,
indicating that when adding the interaction term between
Relational Norms and Agent Cooperativeness to the Individualist
model B, which already has both Relational Norms and Agent
Cooperativeness as two independent variables, only the interaction
termwas significant (p< 0.05) and negatively related to Opportun-
ism, and theoverallmodelwas significant atp < 0.01. It appears that
in thismodel, the explanatory power of Relational Norms and Agent
Cooperativeness as independent variables was subsumed by the
interaction term. In addition, the incrementalR2 of the Interactionist
model over the Individualistmodel Bwas significant at p < 0.05 and
improved the total explained variation in Opportunism from 16% R2
in the Individualist model B to 20% R2 in the Interactionist model.
Therefore, the results provide support for Hypothesis 3.
To examine the importance of Relational Norms, Agent
Cooperativeness, and their interaction as separate explanatory
variables of Opportunism, we also performed a usefulness analysis
through the use of hierarchical regression (Darlington, 1968).
Usefulness analysis examines the contribution of an explanatory
variable to the unique variance of a response variable beyond the
contribution of another explanatory variable and has been
commonly used in the literature (e.g., Connelly et al., 2007;
Driscoll, 1978; Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Randall et al., 1999).
The usefulness analysis results are summarized in Table 3.
The results in Table 3 indicate that when Relational Norms was
the focal variable and was removed from the complete model, the
R2 of the reduced model was 2% less than that of the complete
model. This R2 reductionwas not statistically significant (p > 0.05),
suggesting that Relational Norms did not provide a significant
contribution to the unique variance of Opportunism. Similarly,
when Agent Cooperativeness was the focal variable and removed
from the complete model, the R2 of the reducedmodel was only 1%
less than that of the complete model (p > 0.05), suggesting that
Agent Cooperativeness did not yield a significant unique contri-
bution to the variance of Opportunism. However, when the
Relational Norms–Agent Cooperativeness interaction termwas the
focal variable and dropped from the complete model, the R2 of the
reduced model was 4% less than that of the complete model. This
change in R2 was also statistically significant at p < 0.05 and
comparable to those in previous research involving interaction
effects (e.g., Tepper and Taylor, 2003). Finally, when Relational
Norms, Agent Cooperativeness, and their interaction term together
were dropped from the complete model, the R2 of the reduced
model was 16% less than that of the complete model and
significant at p < 0.001. Collectively, the results of the usefulness
analysis indicate that the interaction of Relational Norms and
Agent Cooperativeness was the only explanatory variable that
provided significant contribution to the unique variance of
Opportunism whereas Relational Norms and Agent Cooperative-
ness in isolation were not. These results are also consistent with
those of the Interactionist model in the regression analysis
discussed above, and provide support for Hypothesis 3. In addition,
the largest explained variance of Opportunism stemmed from the
combination of Relational Norms, Agent Cooperativeness, and their
interaction as explanatory variables.
Finally, the tests between-subjects effects in the two-way
ANOVA indicated that there was a significant interaction effect
Table 3
Usefulness analysis results in Study 1.
Focal variable Remaining variables in the model R2 of the
model
Usefulness of
focal variablea
Incremental
F value
All Variables (complete model) Control Variables +Relational Norms+Agent Cooperativeness
+ (Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
0.20 – –
Relational Norms Control Variables +Agent Cooperativeness +
(Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
0.17b 0.02b 2.55
Agent Cooperativeness Control Variables +Relational Norms+
(Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
0.19 0.01 0.75
(Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness) Control Variables +Relational Norms+Agent Cooperativeness 0.16 0.04 4.14*
Relational Norms+Agent Cooperativeness
+ (Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
Control Variables 0.04 0.16 6.01***
a The usefulness of the focal variable is determined by the difference of the R2 of the complete model and that of the reduced model, which excludes such focal variable.
b These two numbers do not sum up to 0.20 due to rounding.
* p<0.05.
*** p<0.001.
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between Relational Norms and Agent Cooperativeness (F = 5.72,
p < 0.05), which is also consistent with the regression analysis
results of the Interactionist model. The results of group mean
comparisons, summarized in Table 4, indicated that there were
significant differences in Opportunism means among the four
groups (p < 0.01), and the Bonferroni post hoc comparisons then
revealed that only the mean of the Interactionist group was
significantly different from those of baseline, Organizationalist,
and Individualist groups at the 0.01, 0.01, and 0.05 levels,
respectively. No other post hoc pair comparison yielded significant
results. The pattern of Opportunism across Relational Norms and
Agent Cooperativeness groups is illustrated in Fig. 3. These results
yielded an additional support for Hypothesis 3, suggesting that the
interaction between high Relational Norms and high Agent
Cooperativeness holds the key to mitigating Opportunism in
exchange relationships and that high Relational Norms without
high Cooperativeness of human agents or vice versa may not be
adequate in preventing opportunism from taking place in
exchange relationships.
5. Study 2
5.1. Experimental replication and results
To further validate the findings in Study 1, we replicated the
experiment with 83 purchasing professionals (i.e., purchasing
managers and directors) in Study 2. The sample characteristics of
Study 2 were as follows: (a) 77.1% male and 22.9% female; (b) 91.6%
Fig. 3. Pattern of opportunism across groups in Study 1.
Table 4
Results of group mean comparisons in Study 1.
Group Opportunism mean Bonferroni post hoc comparisona Mean difference
Group 1: baseline 0.19 (n=29) Group 1 Group 2 0.11
Low relational norms Group 3 0.08
Low agent cooperativeness Group 4 0.84**
Group 2: organizationalist 0.31 (n=22) Group 2 Group 1 0.11
High relational norms Group 3 0.19
Low agent cooperativeness Group 4 0.95**
Group 3: individualist 0.11 (n=24) Group 3 Group 1 0.08
Low relational norms Group 2 0.19
High agent cooperativeness Group 4 0.76*
Group 4: interactionist 0.64 (n=27) Group 4 Group 1 0.84**
High relational norms Group 2 0.95**
High agent cooperativeness Group 3 0.76*
Grand group Weighted mean Unweighted mean
Low relational norms 0.16 0.15
High relational norms 0.22 0.17
Low agent cooperativeness 0.24 0.25
High agent cooperativeness 0.29 0.27
a The overall one-way ANOVA model was significant at the 0.01 level with F value of 5.83.
* p<0.05.
** p<0.01.
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Caucasian and 8.4% non-Caucasian; (c) 21.7%, 45.7%, and 32.6%
employed at firms with annual revenues of less than $10 million,
$10–99.99 million, and $100 million or more, respectively; (d) an
average age of 49.1 years; and (e) an average purchasing manage-
ment experience of 13.9 years. We took the same methodological
steps as used in Study 1 (i.e., research design, random assignment,
manipulation check, data analyses, etc.) with the only exception that
theexperiment inStudy2wasconductedonlinewhile that inStudy1
was conducted in a classroom setting. In the data analyses, firm size
byrevenuewasordinallycodedas:1 for less than$1million,2 for$1–
9.99 million, 3 for $10–49.99 million, 4 for $50–99.99 million, 5 for
$100–499.99million, 6 for $500–999.99million, and 7 for $1 billion
or more. The results of multiple regression and usefulness analyses
are summarized in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
Similar to those in Study 1, the results of the Organizationalist
model in Table 5 provide limited support for Hypothesis 1, as the
overall model was not significant although Relational Norms was
negatively related to Opportunism (p < 0.05), and the incremental
R2 (5%) of the Organizationalist model over the control model was
significant (p < 0.05). The results in Table 5 also indicate that the
Individualist model A was significant overall (p < 0.05) and that
Agent Cooperativeness was negatively related to Opportunism
(p < 0.05). The incremental R2 (7%) of the Individualist model A
over the control model was significant (p < 0.05). These results
thus support Hypothesis 2a, resembling the findings in Study 1.
The results of the Individualist model B indicate that after
controlling for Relational Norms, Agent Cooperativeness was still
significant (p < 0.05) and negatively related to Opportunism, and
the overall model and the incremental R2 (7%) of the Individualist
model B over the Organizationalist model were both significant
(p < 0.05). These results thus provide support for Hypothesis 2b,
consistent with the conclusion in Study 1. However, the results of
the Individualist model B in Study 2 somewhat deviate from those
in Study 1, as Relational Norms was still significant (p < 0.05) in
the model and negatively related to Opportunism. This suggests
that Relational Norms (an organization-level characteristic) can
potentially coexist with Agent Cooperativeness (an individual-
level characteristic) in influencing Opportunism.
Finally, the results of the Interactionist model indicate that the
overall model was significant at p < 0.01, and that after adding the
Relational Norms–Agent Cooperativeness interaction term to the
Individualist model B, only the interaction term and Relational
Norms were significant (p < 0.05) and negatively related to
Opportunism. The explanatory power of Agent Cooperativeness
as an independent variable was diminished. These findings
deviated somewhat from those in Study 1, in which the interaction
term was the only significant explanatory variable in the
Interactionist model. In addition, the incremental R2 (5%) of the
Interactionist model over the Individualist model B was significant
at p < 0.05, thus supporting Hypothesis 3 as in Study 1.
Table 6
Usefulness analysis results in Study 2.
Focal variable Remaining variables in the model R2 of the
model
Usefulness of
focal variablea
Incremental
F value
All Variables (complete model) Control Variables +Relational Norms+Agent Cooperativeness
+ (Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
0.24 – –
Relational Norms Control Variables +Agent Cooperativeness
+ (Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
0.20 0.04 4.14*
Agent Cooperativeness Control Variables +Relational Norms
+ (Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
0.24 0.00 0.05
(Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness) Control Variables +Relational Norms
+Agent Cooperativeness
0.19 0.05 5.11*
Relational Norms+Agent Cooperativeness +
(Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness)
Control Variables 0.07 0.17 5.58**
a The usefulness of the focal variable is determined by the difference of the R2 of the complete model and that of the reduced model, which excludes such focal variable.
* p<0.05.
** p<0.01.
Table 5
Multiple regression analysis results in Study 2.
Dependent variable: opportunism Beta
Control model Organizationalist
model
Individualist
model A
Individualist
model B
Interactionist
model
Control variables
Gender 0.14 (0.25) 0.11 (0.25) 0.14 (0.24) 0.11 (0.24) 0.15 (0.23)
Ethnicity 0.43 (0.38) 0.28 (0.37) 0.58 (0.37) 0.44 (0.37) 0.49 (0.36)
Age 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Purchasing management experience 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
Firm size by revenue 0.07 (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) 0.08 (0.06) 0.10y (0.06) 0.10y (0.06)
Independent variables
Relational Norms 0.44* (0.20) 0.41* (0.20) 0.39* (0.19)
Agent Cooperativeness 0.40* (0.16) 0.38* (0.15) 0.05 (0.21)
Relational NormsAgent Cooperativeness 0.64* (0.28)
R2 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.24
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.16
F value 1.15 1.76 2.12* 2.49* 2.94**
Incremental R2 0.05a 0.07a 0.07b 0.05c
Incremental F value 4.57* 6.56* 6.16* 5.11*
a Incremental R2 from comparing with the control model.
b Incremental R2 from comparing with the organizationalist model.
c Incremental R2 from comparing with the individualist model B.
y p<0.1.
* p<0.05.
** p<0.01.
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In Table 6, the usefulness analysis results indicate that the
removal of Relational Norms from the complete model led to a
significant R2 reduction (4%, p < 0.05), suggesting that Relational
Norms provided a significant contribution to the unique variance
of Opportunism, which is contrary to the findings in Study 1.When
Agent Cooperativenesswas removed from the completemodel, the
R2 of the reduced model was largely indifferent from that of the
complete model (p > 0.05). This suggests that Agent Cooperative-
ness did not provide a significant unique contribution to the
variance of Opportunism, which is consistent with the findings in
Study 1. However, when the Relational Norms–Agent Coopera-
tiveness interaction term was removed from the complete model,
the R2 reduction (5%) was significant at p < 0.05, resembling the
findings in Study 1. Finally, when Relational Norms, Agent
Cooperativeness, and their interaction term together were
removed from the complete model, the R2 reduction (17%) was
significant at p < 0.01, largely consistent with the findings in Study
1. In short, the usefulness analysis results in Study 2 suggest that
Relational Norms and its interaction with Agent Cooperativeness
were the only explanatory variables that provided significant
contribution to the unique variance of Opportunism, which is
consistent with the results of the Interactionistmodel in Table 5. In
addition, the results of ANOVA and group mean comparisons,
summarized in Table 7, indicate that only the mean of the
Interactionist group significantly differed from those of baseline,
Organizationalist, and Individualist groups at the 0.01, 0.01, and
0.05 levels, respectively, and no other pair comparison yielded
significant results. These findings are consistent with those in
Study 1 and resemble the pattern of Opportunism across different
groups, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported.
5.2. Post-experimental interviews
Since interviewdata are considered a valuable source of research
evidence (Yin, 2003) and provide richness of explanations of various
phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989), we conducted post-experimental
semi-structured interviews to provide a richer context and
explanatory qualifications to our experimental results. The inter-
viewquestions focusedon the importanceof agent characteristics in
purchasing practice as well as related topics surrounding the role of
purchasing agents in buyer–supplier relationships and the types of
decisions made by purchasing professionals. To provide a detailed
picture of these issues, we interviewed 18 experienced purchasing
professionals (i.e., buyers, purchasing managers, and purchasing
directors) from different companies in various industries, including
automotive, aerospace, heavy machinery, and electronics. Once no
new information was forthcoming, this marked the data saturation
point (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and the interviewswere ended. The
results of the interviews are summarized as follows.
5.2.1. Criticality of decision-making agents
It is clear that among the panel of interviewees there was a
consensus that the role of purchasing professionals was very
important to establishing and maintaining formal relationships
between buyer and supplier firms. The establishment of both
formal partnerships between buyer and supplier firms, coopera-
tion between agents within those firms, and agent characteristics
were cited as key factors in engaging in prolonged business. The
quotes provided in the excerpts below illustrate this point.
‘‘. . .in the long term, the more patient and cooperative and
human you are, the more you get in the long run. . . It’s not
always good to have feelings in business, but sometimes it is. If
there’s going to be a delay in supply, just deal with it if it’s
temporary.’’
– Purchasing Manager, heavy machinery parts distributor.
‘‘If there happens to be a purchasing person who is opportu-
nistic and aggressive, and always seems like he is not creating a
win-win situation, it doesn’t really matter that we have this
great partnership relationship. The personality of the person in
purchasing is very important.’’
– Purchasing Director, Tier 1 heavy truck and trailer compo-
nents supplier.
Indeed, the role of the purchasing agent is so critical to
maintaining healthy buyer–supplier relationships that in some
situations, it can make or break an existing exchange relationship.
‘‘I think that no matter who you deal with at any level, personality
is important,’’ explained a Purchasing Manager from a Tier 1
electronics supplier. ‘‘. . . In my case, the personality of the agent I
was working with broke some existing relationships.’’ Some
Table 7
Results of group mean comparisons in Study 2.
Group Opportunism mean Bonferroni post hoc comparisona Mean difference
Group 1: baseline 0.25 (n=22) Group 1 Group 2 0.04
Low relational norms Group 3 0.12
Low agent cooperativeness Group 4 0.88**
Group 2: organizationalist 0.28 (n=21) Group 2 Group 1 0.04
High relational norms Group 3 0.16
Low agent cooperativeness Group 4 0.92**
Group 3: individualist 0.12 (n=20) Group 3 Group 1 0.12
Low relational norms Group 2 0.16
High agent cooperativeness Group 4 0.76*
Group 4: interactionist 0.63 (n=20) Group 4 Group 1 0.88**
High relational norms Group 2 0.92**
High agent cooperativeness Group 3 0.76*
Grand group Weighted mean Unweighted mean
Low relational norms 0.19 0.19
High relational norms 0.16 0.18
Low agent cooperativeness 0.27 0.27
High agent cooperativeness 0.25 0.26
a The overall one-way ANOVA model was significant at the 0.01 level with F value of 5.20.
* p<0.05.
** p<0.01.
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interviewees even recited specific cases of how agent turnover
could disrupt or destroy long-established relationships. These are
illustrated in the testimonials below:
‘‘I mean, come to think about it, I remember a situation. . . it was
a lot of damage done by one of the supplier reps because of
turnover (in personnel). There was a lot of damage done
because of the supply rep. A new guy took over and there was a
lot of damage done. This guy ruined a relationship that was in
place for many, many years. . . They ended up firing him.’’
– Buyer, major U.S. automaker.
‘‘I have had a couple of occasions over the years where we had a
supplier that ended up losing our business because of an agent
change, a sales rep change. They later changed and terminated
the sales agent, and the VP had come back to us to get our
business back. So we said that when the next RFP (request for
price) comes around, we will consider it. The relationship was
severed due to deterioration because of the new sales agent. . .
Really, personality has a lot to do with that.’’
– Purchasing Manager, textile manufacturer.
5.2.2. Agent decision-making authority and supplier selection
Another resulting observation from the interviews dealt with
the decision-making authority of purchasing professionals and
their role in supplier selection. With regards to decision-making
authority, the vast majority of those interviewed acknowledged
that within their particular organizations, purchasing agents were
given a rather large amount of decision-making authority. Based
on our interviews, decisions that could be made by purchasing
personnel without mandatory group or supervisory approval
included allowing a supplier to ship late, choosing which suppliers
to work with, soliciting bids, and negotiating piece prices. When
asked how much decision-making within the purchasing function
is made at the individual and group levels, a Purchasing Director at
an aerospace components supplier stated,
‘‘Probably 85% of it I can make on my own. I have a purchasing
manager that works under me that makes about 65%-70% of
decisions on her own. On the 15% I can’t make, I go to my vice-
president and work those out. Those deal with contract
constraints or problems. . . I can delay delivery on my own
call and my own buyers can do that as well.’’
The same Purchasing Manager from the heavy machinery parts
distributor stated that his own organization entrusts him with
extensive decision-making power with regards to working with
suppliers.
‘‘In my situation, I can buy with whomever I want to buy with.
My owners trust me enough to pursue whoever and whatever I
want to pursue since I’ve been there long enough. Based on
availability of funds, they might micromanage a little bit, but if
it’s within budget, they give me flexibility. There are some
people that they don’t like, so we try to stay away from those
guys. Besides that, they let me decide who I want to buy from
and who I will buy from.’’
Based on the commensurate amount of decision-making
authority granted to purchasing professionals, it is not surprising
that the nature of exchange relationships between buyers and
suppliers is largely shaped by individual purchasing professionals
and their personal characteristics. With regards to supplier
selection, personal characteristics were never cited as something
formally considered in selecting prospective suppliers even though
they were cited as a key factor that could make or break exchange
relationships. The most common factors cited in supplier selection
included quality, delivery, price, technical capability, and geo-
graphic location. This omission of personal characteristicsmight be
because they are deemed less rigorous and subjective in nature as a
selection criterion. The same Purchasing Director from the Tier 1
heavy truck and trailer components supplier echoed this view by
explaining, ‘‘In choosing a supplier, we do try to avoid personality.
It needs to be on more of an objective level.’’
5.2.3. Changing relationships in challenging times
Yet another interesting observation fromthe interviews involved
the change in purchasing practice during changing economic times.
In an economic recession, purchasing professionals expressed that
they would not be too aggressive in pursuing excessive price
reductions from their suppliers as they normally would in healthier
economic times. ‘‘There will be normal price pressures,’’ stated one
PurchasingManager at another aerospace company, ‘‘but I won’t be
too aggressive since they have to stay in business as well. . ..’’ They
also dealt more cautiously with their suppliers and were less
stringent with deadlines and cost reductions. Adherence to dead-
lines and the pursuit of cost savings were often accompanied by a
cooperative openness andwillingness towork together in achieving
these goals, at least with key suppliers. It appears that during
economically challenging times, some buyer–supplier relationships
have moved more toward cooperative arrangements rather than
arm’s length. This shift towards cooperative arrangements can be
observed in the following excerpts:
I think in these times, it’s becoming more cooperative because
with rare exception, everyone is in the same boat and everyone
is trying to reduce expenses. . . In a boom time, it’s kind of pick
and choose. You are really not concerned so much with the
long-term consequences. There is always a backup (supplier). . .
In a tough economic time, you are more involved with your
suppliers and there is a sense of cooperation. You really
appreciate the struggles each supplier goes through and they
appreciate what you are going through.’’
– PurchasingDirector, Tier 1 commercialmanufacturing supplier.
‘‘What we’ve done with the top suppliers, we’ve actually told
themwewill protect them.Wewill not nickel and dime them to
get price reductions. But in the same case, we had a program in
corporate where we needed to get price reductions and we met
the goal. We didn’t go in and demand it, and we worked
together. For example, we sell half-a-million dollar machines.
We came back for a 5% savings that the supplier was willing to
save for us.We did this for a riggingmachine project. Obviously,
we saved the freight and we had shared savings. Suppliers have
to understand that you will not nickel and dime them.’’
– Purchasing Manager, major fabrication machinery manufac-
turer.
6. Discussion and conclusion
6.1. Result discussion
Theoverall results inbothexperimental studies, coupledwith the
qualitative interview data, support the thrust that agents domatter
in buyer–supplier relationships. The experimental results of Study 1
and Study 2were largely consistent except for the significance of the
main effect of relational norms on opportunism, which was
significant in Study 2 but not in Study 1. This variation in the
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resultsmaybedue to the sampledifferences, as the subjects in Study
1 were mostly young business professionals in MBA courses (28.6
years old on average) with relatively limited management experi-
ence (1.8 years on average), whereas the subjects in Study 2 were
seasoned purchasing professionals (49.1 years old and with 13.9
years of purchasing management experience on average). It is
possible that decision-making agents with greater managerial
maturity are more likely to recognize the importance of relational
norms and have these norms as a primary guidance for their modus
operandi. Relational norms thus exert a stronger main effect on
opportunismtendenciesamong theseagents thanamong thosewith
far less managerial maturity. The significant and negative effect of
relational normsonopportunism found in Study2 is consistentwith
the extant buyer–supplier relationship literature (e.g., Carson et al.,
2006; Heide and John, 1992; Macneil, 1980).
However, departing from the current literature, the key findings
of Study 1 and Study 2 did converge and highlighted the significant
interaction effect of relational norms (organization-level) and agent
cooperativeness (agent-level) in mitigating opportunism. In both
studies, the Interactionist model yielded significantly greater
explained variance in opportunism than the Organizationalist and
Individualist models, and the inclusion of the relational norms –
agent cooperativeness interaction term into the model indeed
rendered the main effect of agent cooperativeness on opportunism
insignificant. These results suggest that themulti-level Interactionist
model encompassing relational norms, agent cooperativeness, and
their interaction is amore completemodel than a single-levelmodel
(i.e., relational norms or agent cooperativeness in isolation) in
explaining opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships, and that
agent cooperativeness only acts in concert with relational norms in
mitigatingbuyer–supplieropportunism.Thepatternofopportunism
across groups, revealed by the ANOVA and illustrated in Fig. 3, also
highlights this point and reinforces the importance of taking both
relational norms and agent cooperativeness into account when
considering opportunism mitigation in buyer–supplier relation-
ships. As these findings were consistent in both studies, we can
presume that the interaction effect of relational norms and agent
cooperativeness on opportunism is generalizable in both young/
upcoming and seasoned/established decision-making agents.
An explanation for these findings is based on the notion that
relationalnormsmayprovide a context inwhichhumanagentswith
various degrees of cooperativeness operate. Although highly
cooperative agents who are described as empathetic, supportive,
and compassionatemay be by nature less likely to act opportunisti-
cally, when operating in a competitive, low relational norm context,
they may be reluctant to act according to their own conscience. In
the terms of Tett and Guterman (2000), the low relational norm
context may not be considered a trait-relevant context for agents
with high cooperativeness as their personality trait. As a result, the
cooperativeness of the agent cannot fully exert its opportunism-
reducing effect in the low relational norm context. However, when
human agents with low cooperativeness operate in a cooperative,
high relational norm context, those agents who are less likely to
cooperate by nature may not comply with the established
cooperative, relational norms (e.g., Anderson and Jap, 2005).
Consequently, the opportunism-reducing effect of relational norms
ispotentially compromisedbyuncooperativehumanagents, and the
recurring opportunismmay eventually drive the relationship to the
point of dissolution, as suggested by the interview data (Section
5.2.1). The descriptive results in Tables 4 and 7, and Fig. 3 also
suggest that this uncooperative agent/high relational norm scenario
appeared to breed the highest degree of opportunism in exchange
relationships among all four scenarios. As such, the best-case
scenario regarding opportunism reduction is when cooperative
agents operate in a high relational norm context. In this circum-
stance, the natural predispositions of the cooperative agents are
consonant with the operational guidance of the relational norms;
therefore, the opportunism-reducing effects of both agent coopera-
tiveness and relational norms can be fully realized. This line of
reasoning is consistent with the fundamental logic of both
contingency theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) and the trait
activation principle (e.g., Tett and Guterman, 2000).
6.2. Theoretical and managerial implications
The findings in this study provide two distinct theoretical
implications. Thefirst implication fromthis study is oriented toward
theoretical development approaches in general. Our findings
support Klassen and Menor’s (2007) and Rousseau’s (1985)
argument for the strength of multi-level theories, as the interac-
tionist perspective, a multi-level theoretical lens that centers on the
interaction effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on
opportunism, appears to be amore completemodel of opportunism
mitigation than a single-level theoretical perspective. Single-level
theories have been the primary theoretical lens in guiding the
theoretical development of research studies in the extant literature.
The results of this study hopefully shed some light on the greater
promise of an alternative, multi-level theoretical approach.
The second theoretical implication is gearedmore specifically to
the supply chain and buyer–supplier opportunism literature. Our
experimental results, coupled with the purchasing professional
interview data, support our thesis that agent cooperativeness does
matter in buyer–supplier opportunism mitigation; however, agent
cooperativeness mitigates opportunism interactively with, rather
thanmutuallyexclusive from,relationalnorms.Toplace thefindings
of this study in a broader stream of the literature, we maintain that
this study takes another step further in the evolutionary path of
contractual-relational governance. The transaction cost literature
suggests that contracts alone may not be sufficient in mitigating
opportunism when the degree of uncertainty is high because
contract writers are not omniscient, and contracts can only cover
contingencies that are anticipated at the outset (e.g., Williamson,
1985). Thus, there is a growing consensus in the literature that
relational norms, a foundation of which can be paved by well-
specified contracts (PoppoandZenger, 2002), are needed tomitigate
opportunism to a large extent (e.g., Carson et al., 2006; Heide and
John, 1992; Macneil, 1980). Furthering this line of research, our
findings suggest that relational norms in the absence of cooperative
decision-making agents in exchange relationships may not effectu-
ate the control of opportunism to the extent that we once thought,
and that the alignment between relational norms and agent
cooperativeness appears to be fundamental to an effective mecha-
nism to control opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships.
Providing this new insight, this study thus makes a unique
contribution to the current stream of the literature.
Our findings also provide four managerial implications. First, in
supply chain staffingdecisions, seniormanagers should consider the
personal characteristics (i.e., cooperativeness) of key personnel
(such as purchasing and supply chain managers) in charge of
managing buyer–supplier exchanges to ensure that the personal
characteristics of purchasing or supply chain managers are aligned
with the relational norm context of their buyer–supplier relation-
ships. Assigning uncooperative individuals to manage relationships
endowed with high relational norms would in effect compromise
the relational governance mechanisms of the relational norms and
may consequentially lead to the break-up of the relationships, as
reported in our interviews (Section 5.2.1). Similarly, utilizing
cooperative individuals to operate in a low relational norm context
would put the agents in a difficult situation in which they are
compelled to comply with the competitive nature of the low
relational norms, making them less effective in controlling
opportunism. To fully harness the opportunism-mitigating effects
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of both agent cooperativeness and relational norms, cooperative
individuals should thus be assigned to manage the relationships
characterized by high relational norms.
Second, given the dynamism in today’s business landscape,
personnel turnover, either through corporate restructuring and
downsizing or through voluntary careermovement and attrition, is
not uncommon and can have significant ramifications for well-
established relationships, as reported in our interviews (Section
5.2.1). In such cases, changes in personnel may call for reassessing
the alignment between the current relational norm context and
individuals newly appointed to vacant purchasing or supply chain
manager positions. If buyer–supplier relationships are governed by
high relational norms and the newly appointed purchasing or
supply chain managers happen to have low degrees of coopera-
tiveness, this personnel turnover may render the well-established
relational governance less effective in curbing opportunism.
Therefore, any personnel turnover could signal a change in the
relational risks embedded in the relationships. In addition, it seems
advisable that when individuals – whose cooperativeness has yet
to be assessed or determined – are in charge of exchanges in high
relational norm contexts, their superiors, who are responsible for
the outcomes of such exchange relationships, may need to closely
monitor the behaviors of those individuals to ensure that they act
according to such relational norms. This monitoring can help
perpetuate the opportunism-reducing effect of the existing
relational norms.
Another implication drawn from this study is in regard to
supply chain partner selection. Conventional supply partner
selection criteria tend to be driven by company-wide character-
istics such as price-versus-quality reputation, on-time delivery,
and geographic proximity. The results of this study underline the
important role of individual agents in buyer–supplier relation-
ships. Therefore, when a firm is seeking a supply chain partner, it
would be prudent if the selection criteria included not only
company-wide characteristics of the prospective partner firms but
also personal characteristics of the individuals who are in charge of
their exchange relationships. However, the purchasing managers
in our interview reported that they never formally considered
agent personal characteristics as part of their supplier selection
criteria (Section 5.2.2) and the problems due to agent personal
characteristics tended to surface afterward. As such, the prescrip-
tive suggestion from our study to include agent personal
characteristics in the selection criteria can be a preventive effort
that helps to minimize potential problems and achieve more
consistent sourcing outcomes.
Finally, firms’ strategies and supply chain relationships may
evolve (e.g., Lau and Goh, 2005) to cope with episodic changes in
the business environment. For example, firms may transit from a
low relational norm context to a high relational norm context,
probably through the transformation from arm’s length relation-
ships to cooperative relationships as suggested in the interview
data (Section 5.2.3), or through the formation of vertical
complementary alliances with suppliers (e.g., McCarter and
Northcraft, 2007). In these instances, particular attention should
be given to ascertaining that cooperative decision-making agents
are put in place to align with the emerging cooperative and
relational engagements between firms and their suppliers. This
may be achieved through assessing agents’ characteristics and
providing them with the necessary training and education about
their roles, responsibilities, and expectations in these strategic
cooperative endeavors. Incentive policies may also be revised with
the purposes of heightening the agents’ awareness of the changes
towards cooperative exchange relationships and of reinforcing
agents’ cooperative behaviors to be in line with the new working
environment. Ultimately, if the current agents still fail to embrace
the new cooperative orientation in the relationships, it may be
advisable to consider re-staffing, as captured in our interview data
(Section 5.2.1). Bringing in those with proven track records of high
cooperativeness to manage the up-and-coming cooperative
relationships and rotating the less cooperative ones, who would
be more effective in a competitive ambiance, to handle other
transactional exchangesmay be a sound corrective action. Thiswill
help ensure the alignment between agent personal characteristics
and the types of exchange relationships.
6.3. Limitations and future research directions
Although we found interesting results in this study, we
acknowledge there were some limitations, which may provide
directions for future research. First, as mentioned in Section 1, our
study focused only on a single-agent decision scenario to simplify
the research design and operationalization. In retrospect, this
could be considered a reasonable tradeoff, as the purchasing
managers participating in our post-experimental interviews
reported the predominance of single-agent decision circumstances
they have encountered in their career (Section 5.2.2). Nevertheless,
future research can take a step further by focusing on multi-agent
dynamics in buyer–supplier opportunism, and can thus investigate
whether the findings of this study will still be applicable to a more
complex multi-agent scenario.
The second limitation is that the domain of the organization-
level governing force to restrain buyer–supplier opportunism in
this study was confined to relational norms. Although relational
norms are a critical governing factor in the literature, there are
other important factors such as contracts and industry contexts
(i.e., the industry rate of change and the complexity of industry
value chains) that can potentially interplay and influence the
pattern of opportunism in exchange relationships. Similarly,
broader contextual factors such as regulatory, cultural, and
institutional forces can play a significant role in shaping this
buyer–supplier dynamic. Future research may therefore consider
incorporating these sets of factors into the conceptual model and
address their roles in mitigating buyer–supplier opportunism.
Finally, this study focused on only one aspect of agent personal
characteristics, namely, cooperativeness. The literature in the area
of personality and individual differences is well established, with
various personality constructs identified, such as assertiveness,
time urgency, locus of control, etc. Future research could
investigate the role of other agent personal characteristics that
may potentially influence opportunism in buyer–supplier relation-
ships. We hope that this study will encourage others to pursue this
line of research by studying various buyer–supplier relationship
phenomena in tandem with various characteristics or personality
traits of human agents involved in the relationships. We believe
that this research stream could be further developed and
materialized into a fruitful research area.
Acknowledgements
The authors appreciate the constructive comments from the
Editor, Associate Editor, and anonymous reviewers throughout the
reviewprocess. The authors also thank the colleagueswho provided
their assistance in data collection, and each of the schools for their
support important to the completion of this research.
Appendix A. Scenario and experimental manipulations
A.1. Introduction
You are a purchasing manager responsible for the purchase of
microchips for a midsize electronic equipment manufacturer.
Microchips are an important component for the equipment that
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youmanufacture; therefore they need to be purchased on a regular
basis. You have one existing supplier for this component. As
purchasingmanager responsible formicrochips, youfind yourself in
a situation wherein it is not difficult for you to find a suitable
replacement for the existing supplier. If you decide to stop
purchasing from this supplier, you could easily replace their volume
with purchases from alternative suppliers. There are many
competitive suppliers for microchips and you can switch to them
without incurring any search costs. Switching suppliers is not going
to have any negative effects on the quality or design of the
equipment that you manufacture. Your production system can be
easily adapted to use components from a new supplier. The
procedures and routines that you have developed are standard and
they are equally applicablewith any supplier of this component. The
skills that your people have acquired in the process of workingwith
the supplier can easily be changed to fit another supplier’s situation.
You can therefore terminate your relationship with your present
supplier without incurring any costs.
A.2. Low relational norms
Both you and your supplier bring a formal and contract
governed orientation to this relationship. Exchange of informa-
tion in this relationship takes place infrequently, formally, and in
accordance to the terms of a prespecified agreement. Even if you
do know of an event or change that might affect the other party,
you do not divulge this information to them. Strict adherence to
the terms of the original agreement characterizes your relation-
ship with this supplier. Even in the face of unexpected situations,
rather than modifying the contract, you adhere to the original
terms. Youhave an ‘‘arm’s length’’ relationshipwith your supplier.
You do not think that the supplier is committed to your
organization – in fact, you think that if you did not carefully
monitor this supplier’s performance, theywould slack off from the
original terms. Above all, you see your supplier as an external
economic agentwithwhomyou have to bargain in order to get the
best deal for yourself.
A.3. High relational norms
Both you and your supplier bring an open and frank orientation
to the relationship. Exchange of information in this relationship
takes place frequently, informally, and not only according to a
prespecified agreement. You keep each other informed of any
event or change that might affect the other party. Flexibility is a
key characteristic of this relationship. Both sides make ongoing
adjustments to copewith the changing circumstances.When some
unexpected situation arises, the parties would rather work out a
new deal than hold each other responsible to the original terms.
You tend to help each other out in case of unexpected crises. If your
supplier is unable to fulfill an order, they recommend an
alternative source of supply for the same. Above all, you have a
sense that your supplier is committed to your organization and
that they work with you keeping your best interests in mind. You
see each other as partners, not rivals.
A.4. Conclusion
Recently, the supplier informed you that they are involved in a
labor dispute. Consequently, they are temporarily unable to
guarantee on-schedule delivery. This creates some uncertainty
for your organization. Delayed delivery of microchips, may, for
example, cause problems for your organization inmeeting delivery
schedules to customers. The supplier has called to get your regular
order. Drawing from experience, how would you be most likely to
react in this situation? Please rate each of these statements to the
extent that they match with your expectation of your reaction.
(Adapted from Joshi and Arnold (1998)).
Appendix B Measurement
Items Sources
Opportunism
Q1: I would lie to this supplier (e.g., other suppliers are offering lower prices) in order to protect my own interests. Joshi and Arnold (1998)
Q2: I would not be completely honest with this supplier. Joshi and Arnold (1998)
Q3: I would exaggerate my needs in an attempt to force the supplier to deliver on schedule. Joshi and Arnold (1998)
Q4: I would provide the supplier a completely truthful picture of my current business.a Provan and Skinner (1989) (modified)
Q5: I would find a way to use this supplier’s difficult situation to improve my bargaining position.b Provan and Skinner (1989) (modified)
Q6: I would make hollow promises about future orders to influence the supplier to make on-schedule delivery.b Jap and Anderson (2003) (modified)
Agreeableness
A1: I sympathize with others’ feelings. IPIP
A2: I have a soft heart. IPIP
A3: I often take time out for others. IPIP (modified)
A4: I feel others’ emotions. IPIP
A5: I seldom make people feel welcome.a,b IPIP (modified)
A6: I anticipate the needs of others.b IPIP
Teamwork
B1: I enjoy activities that involve a high level of cooperation with other people. Yilmaz and Hunt (2001)
B2: I prefer to work independently more often than in a group.a,b Yilmaz and Hunt (2001)
B3: I enjoy helping others with their problems when working in the team environment.b IPIP (modified)
B4: I believe that teamwork allows common people to achieve uncommon results. O’Shea et al. (2004)
B5: I believe that a person can best achieve his/her goals if others around him/her achieve theirs too. O’Shea et al. (2004)
B6: I feel that working with others usually distracts from the goal.a,b O’Shea et al. (2004) (modified)
Compassion
C1: I forgive others when they offend me.a IPIP (modified)
C2: I believe that people should revenge wrongs that are done to them.a IPIP
C3: I hold a grudge.a IPIP
C4: I do things out of revenge.a IPIP
C5: I often have compassion on those less fortunate than me.a IPIP (modified)
C6: I find it easy to forgive others.a IPIP (modified)
Scale: 1 = very inaccurate and 7 = very accurate in describing you as a person.
a Reverse coded.
b Excluded from the analysis.
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